INTRODUCTION
The subject of regional trade agreements-or to use more recent terminology, "preferential trade agreements" (PTAs)'-has been the focus of POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF "DEEP" VERSUS "BROAD" PTAs integrative sense. While this perspective on regionalism is found in some 6.
literature on the European Union's expansion, it is not often found in discussions of PTAs in other regions. It is submitted here that "deepening versus broadening" is a useful perspective on PTA formation in general, and that it is especially useful when applied to recent U.S. PTA activity. In an age in which regionalism is rivaling multilateralism for dominance in the international trading system, and in light of the United States' recent waning (or at least waffling) adherence to multilateral trade liberalization over regionalism, it is an important topic to explore.
This Article is organized as follows. Part II sets the stage by providing a brief overview of traditional PTA economic theory and traditional taxonomies of PTAs, which have dominated PTA analysis and discussion in many respects. Part II also discusses how traditional PTA economic theory and taxonomies can be in tension with foreign policy and national security considerations of states. Part III builds on and adds complexity to the commercial-versus-security tension in PTA literature by identifying and discussing important thematic points concerning contemporary PTAs.
Part IV then explores a more harmonized view of PTA formation and structure. Part IV begins by comparing modem U.S. PTA decision making to European Community (now European Union) decision making in the 1980s and 1990s regarding expansion of the Community's membership. The Community of that era was engaged in an intense debate over its future shape and scope, and this debate provides an excellent unifying thematic framework for analyzing and better understanding modem PTAs and the factors affecting their formation and scope. While the EU is currently in the midst of further discussions concerning deepening and broadening, the Community's decision making of the 1980s and 1990s is used here for two main reasons. First, the decisions of that earlier era set the EU on the path it is on today, with a highly liberalized internal market and nearly 30 members. Second, the dust has settled on those earlier decisions, whereas contemporary debates regarding further EU deepening and broadening are very much in flux. With this base in place, Part IV then applies the "deepening versus broadening" thematic framework to U.S. PTA activity. Part V concludes by discussing some of the implications of this conceptualization of PTAs for future PTA formation by the United States.
It must be noted at the outset that this Article consciously confines its analysis to a unitary view of state decision making. This is perhaps best thought of as a simplifying assumption. Domestic political considerations clearly do affect state decision making in many ways, which makes analysis of PTA formation and scope more complex, and there has been beneficial public choice theory scholarship along this vein. 7 The recent tensions over U.S. exports of beef to Korea, as part of the potential Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, help to further illustrate the influence of such considerations. 8 In this Article, however, these domestic variables are held constant so that the effect of other variables can be explored.
I. PTAs AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY
PTAs are often thought of primarily in economic or commercial terms, and traditional PTA taxonomies reinforce this view. It is therefore proper to begin with PTA taxonomies in order to establish a conceptual baseline of sorts. As the following discussion illustrates, the traditional, integration-focused PTA taxonomies have acted as a limiting factor on PTA analysis and thinking, and economic or commercial explanations of PTA development remain incomplete. This Article's discussion then turns to modem PTA trends in Part III and of PTA "deepening versus broadening" in Part IV.
A. PTAs and Traditional PTA Taxonomies
Traditional PTA taxonomies focus on PTAs' levels of internal economic integration and cooperation, and thus characterize PTAs as preferential, potentially protectionist organizations. The taxonomies range from less integrated PTA forms, such as free trade agreements (FTAs) like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)-which are characterized by internal trade liberalization but no coordination of monetary policy or a common external tariff (CET)--to more integrated forms such as customs unions with CETs, to even more integrated common markets like the EU that feature broader elimination of internal trade barriers, to monetary unions that coordinate monetary policy and share a single currency or tightly peg their currencies (again, like the EU). 9 The final, logical stage is complete economic integration, which also requires a degree of political integration as well.' 0 While there are variations in the taxonomies employed by various scholars," the main point is that PTA taxonomies are preferentialist and move from less to more integrated forms. This preferentialist view of PTAs is so well established that it is embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.' 2 Traditional PTA taxonomies are relatively clean and intuitive, but they have been rendered incomplete by modem PTA developments. First, all PTAs are not created equal: some are expansive in their scope, while others are limited to certain economic sectors. NAFTA and its accompanying side agreements, for example, are fairly comprehensive in their sectoral scope, whereas the Central America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) is more focused on the textiles sector. 13 Second, there are agreements among states that are not traditional PTAs, but still need to be considered in any discussion of international or regional/preferential integration efforts. For example, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) establish the terms and conditions for foreign direct investment between countries.
14 Because it is generally recognized that foreign direct investment can serve as both a substitute for and a complement to international trade, 15 BITs can have an enormous impact on regional and global trading patterns. The same can be said for tax treaties, which can facilitate (bilateral) trade and investment through the elimination of double taxation.' 6 Additionally, Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs) serve as general trade framework agreements, and at least in some PTA contexts they are being used as precursor agreements to BITs and formal PTAs.' 7 TIFAs can be thought of in one sense as memoranda of understanding that precede formal agreements (PTAs), but even a TIFA that is not followed by a formal PTA can lead to trade benefits among the parties involved.
Third, there may be informal and de facto trade cooperation efforts among states that significantly affect regional and even global trading patterns. For example, the United States and Canada recently began coordinating procedures for inspecting and clearing commercial shipments by truck across their common border, in order to minimize delays without unduly sacrificing the vetting of these shipments.' 8 This program (called "Free and Secure Trade," or "FAST") and other efforts like it are informal, cross-border networks that are being used by countries to coordinate and harmonize regional trade policies in certain respects. 1 9 In some cases, such efforts have developed into more formalized, and perhaps even more global, programs, which is exactly what happened with the FAST program. However, expansion and increased formalization is not necessary for these programs to have a significant impact on regional trade. 20 In other cases, coordination occurs through mutual recognition by states of each other's regulatory regimes in a particular area (such as securities regulation), and this in turn leads to greater economic activity, interdependency and integration among these states. 2 ' Another recent regional trade development is the emergence of "open regionalism," which is contrary to traditional protectionist assumptions regarding PTAs. 22 The primary example of this approach is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), which is "an open regionalism and non-discriminatory" group of "like-minded" countries that "recognize[ ]... Much of the current benefit of APEC arises out of its role as a forum for discussion-a matrix that allows and encourages the formation of formal and informal international networks among APEC states, 24 as well as the harmonization (or mutual recognition) of domestic regulatory regimes in order to promote greater regional trade and integration. 25 In other respects, APEC offers the regional trade liberalizing benefits of a PTA without the potentially exclusionary characteristic of restricted membership. 26 APEC is thus an organization with significant potential benefit (and very little downside), but it is certainly not a traditional PTA.
Fourth, more recent "new regionalism" or "new trade theory" scholarship does not adequately explain recent PTA developments. This body of PTA scholarship appeared in the 1990s 27 and sought to explain PTA developments such as the European Community's "1992 Program ' 2 and NAFTA-which were formed among countries with already low tariff barriers, and thus offered fewer conventional gains from trade liberalization. 29 New regionalism scholarship focused instead on the reduction of nontariff barriers to trade, as well as on the promotion of growth through imperfect competition and economies of scale (via establishment of a larger, more integrated regional market for businesses offering differentiated products). 30 These were positive developments in PTA economic scholarship--and yet in important respects they were not as new as the names suggest. First and foremost, attention remained focused on formal PTAs, as opposed to any broader view of regional cooperation and coordination. PTA analysis thus often continued to be confined or constrained by its own definitions of PTA activity. Second, the shift from focusing on tariff barriers to focusing on nontariff barriers was in a large sense not substantive, but rather a shift in the form of protectionist barriers addressed. 31 For that matter, the relatively newfound focus on the gains from a larger market was also implicit in earlier PTA analyses.
The point here is not to suggest that traditional views or taxonomies of PTAs are not useful. Rather, the key point is that PTAs are more appropriately thought of as embedded in a larger matrix of sub-global economic integration activities. When thought of in this manner, it becomes easier to identify broader trends in regionalization.
B. PTAs, Redistributive Effects, and Gains from Trade
In addition to the definitional shortcomings discussed above, two 27 . See RICHARD among states with structurally similar economies, or at least structurally similar sectors (if the agreements are limited to those sectors). While this tension can be partly reconciled by imperfect competition analysis and economies of scale considerations, it is not at all clear that these observations of new regionalism fully eliminate this tension. 3 7 As a result, there appears to be continued conflict between these primary aspects of neoclassical trade theory-with one principle suggesting that PTAs should be formed by countries with similar economic structures, and the other suggesting the opposite.
C. PTAs, National Security, and Foreign Policy
In further tension with trade liberalization considerations for PTAs are considerations of national security or foreign policy. The formation of PTAs for national security or foreign policy reasons, as opposed to commercial reasons, has been emphasized in particular by the United States since the 9/11 attacks.
3 8 On the one hand, formation of PTAs for such non-commercial reasons is not a new development. 39 Indeed, the United States' first PTA, the 1985 U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement, was entered into by the United States largely for non-commercial reasons-namely, the greater security and stability of Israel. 40 It was readily apparent then that the commercial or economic gains to the United States from a PTA with the small Israeli economy would be modest at best. What is new in recent years, however, is how frequently PTAs are being entered into by the United States (and other countries) for largely non-commercial reasons. Fifteen years passed between the formation of the U.S.-Israel FTA and the United States' next small-country PTA, the U.S.-Jordan FTA. Since that time, three more U.S. National security in fact can be viewed as a subset of broader foreign policy concerns, but it is a driving, and arguably primary, force of foreign policy (both of the United States and other states) in the post-9/l I era. For that reason, these two terms-as well as the term "noncommercial"--are treated as generally synonymous for purposes of this Article.
important trends concerning modem PTAs.
A. PTAs Have Proliferated as Multilateral Trade Liberalization has Slowed
A common observation regarding the popularity of PTAs since the 1990s is that they have proliferated at the very point in time at which multilateral progress on trade liberalization has slowed dramatically. 48 There are now many more parties involved in global trade liberalization efforts through the World Trade Organization (WTO), which makes multilateral agreement much harder. In addition, the current topics on which WTO multilateral trade liberalization focuses-such as service sectors and agriculture-tend to be thornier topics plagued by contention. 49 The fact that less progress is currently being made on multilateral trade liberalization suggests that PTAs are indeed being used as a second-best strategy for trade liberalization-something that is bemoaned by some observers° and lauded by others."
B. International Trade has Grown Exponentially in Recent Decades
Another trend relevant to PTA formation is that the total volume of international trade has grown dramatically in recent decades, which amplifies the effects of trade diversion and trade creation, as well as of economies of scale. 52 Multilateral trade liberalization has slowed over the same time period during which international trade has become ever more important-which has enhanced the attractiveness of other approaches to liberalizing trade, such as PTAs.
C. PTAs Reflect Changes in Political and Economic Orders
The increased use of PTAs also reflects fundamental changes in the world's political and economic orders. There has been a splintering of state interests since the Cold War: there are no overarching, bipolar considerations to centripetally point trading partners-at least Western ones-in the same 48 53 The effect is that progress in multilateral trade liberalization is reduced. Instead, states have increasingly divergent interests, based on their particular political and economic needs-and in some cases there is perhaps greater emphasis being placed on non-commercial security considerations. This is a key point that plays out starkly in the PTA context: when a state's vectors and patterns of trade, as well as its security and foreign policy interests, are concentrated on specific countries or regions, as opposed to being generally diffused across a larger, more multilateral landscape, the effect is that PTAs are more likely to be established with those countries or regions. In this sense, the "second-best" PTA approach to trade liberalization indeed may be a more stable equilibrium than multilateral liberalization. 
D. Both Commercially-Driven and Security-Driven PTAs are Intended to be Mutually Beneficial Exchanges among PTA Parties
While some recent PTAs appear to be driven heavily, and even primarily, by non-commercial security considerations, even non-commercially driven PTAs involve the exchange of benefits (or intended benefits) among PTA parties. That is, even in instances where policy considerations or national security concerns are paramount, the situation is characterized by the trading of one benefit for another in the classic comparative or absolute advantage context. There is, in other words, an exchange of economic benefits for noneconomic benefits, of security for economic gain. 5 The U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement again serves as an example. The United States entered into that free trade agreement to help stabilize Israel. Israel has gained enormously from an economic perspective 5 6 -it is able to consume far beyond its autarkic Production Possibility Frontier. 57 
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Agreement. 59 The most recent, and in some ways quintessential, example of a PTA effort driven primarily by policy concerns is the Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) initiative announced in 2003 by U.S. President George W. Bush. 6°T he Middle East countries targeted by that initiative are not large, and they offer relatively little to the United States in terms of direct commercial gains from trade. Many of these countries, however, do offer the United States access to oil and natural gas, and all could play significant political roles in the pursuit of U.S. national security and foreign policy interests in the Middle East. In contrast, greater access to the U.S. market could be highly beneficial commercially for these Middle Eastern countries. While it is questionable whether the MEFTA initiative will bear much fruit (there has been little visible progress on it in recent years 61 ), and it is also questionable whether it represents the best or easiest method for ensuring U.S. access to Middle East petroleum resources or for fostering Middle East economic and political stability, the larger point is that the MEFTA initiative is an apparent attempt to exchange economic for non-economic benefits. The wisdom of that bargain is an entirely 62 separate question. This observation about bargaining among PTA members carries important considerations for this Article's "deepening versus broadening" analysis, since, as will be discussed below, deepening is generally undertaken to achieve commercial gains, while broadening may be undertaken for commercial gain or as an exchange of commercial for non-commercial benefits.
E. "Failed" Security-Driven PTA Initiatives Might be Policy "Successes"
For national security-or foreign policy-driven PTAs, it is important to bear in mind that because of these goals, PTA proposals that do not actually 59. This phenomenon of the smaller state benefiting much more from trade liberalization than large states has been colorfully described as "the importance of being unimportant. 61. One also might expect that as a second Bush administration initiative, it will be given little priority as a formal program by the Obama administration.
62. Analogizing PTA efforts to contract negotiations, the point is one of freedom of contract-the ability, or freedom, to enter into a bad bargain for a legitimate purpose. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 17(1) (1981) ("[The formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration.").
[Vol. 19:3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF "DEEP" VERSUS "BROAD" PTAs come to pass might not always be policy failures. Rather, in some cases these proposals actually could be considered foreign policy or national security successes of varying degree. Again, MEFTA serves as an excellent example. As noted above, the United States has made little progress recently toward the establishment of MEFTA, and one might surmise that with the change in U.S. presidential administrations it may be moribund. Total progress on the initiative is thus likely limited to the already-accomplished preliminary steps of establishing trade and investment framework agreements (TIFAs), bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and bilateral PTAs with some of the proposed MEFTA members. 63 However, one can argue that even with the lack of a full PTA, MEFTA still may have been at least partly successful from a policy perspective, above and beyond its use as a signaling mechanism for greater U.S. focus on Middle East prosperity. 64 That is, the U.S. national security goals embodied in the MEFTA initiative may still be achieved, at least in part, because of the launch of MEFTA. The proposal to form MEFTA coincided with increased dialogue among Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states: 65 these countries began discussing whether the GCC, which historically has been more of a political forum than a trading bloc, could or should be revamped to increase the GCC's economic and policy role in the Middle East. 66 
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undertaken to promote greater economic coordination and even the possible achievement of a monetary union. 6 8 In economic terms, then, regional integrative competition from the United States may have resulted in greater accountability for the GCC and might encourage changes within the GCC. A stronger GCC could be beneficial to the United States in many respects. Even though the United States would not be a GCC member state (as opposed to a MEFTA member state) and would have to trade with the GCC as a third party, GCC countries, through their efforts, might achieve greater economic cooperation, integration and growth. This in turn might lead to greater economic opportunities and an improvement of stability in the region, all of which are goals the United States desires and seeks to foster through MEFTA. 6 9 MEFTA thus might not be successfully formed, but this initiative still might achieve some of its key objectives.
III. A THEMATICALLY UNIFIED VIEW OF PTAS: "DEEPENING" VERSUS
"BROADENING"
The above discussion illustrates that the subject of PTAs is messy and complex. PTAs are characterized by significant variety in form and scope, and also by apparent tensions between their desired (and undesired) effects. The increasing growth of international trade, difficulties in WTO trade liberalization, and recent changes in the global political and economic orders, such as the end of the Cold War, have affected PTAs substantially. Each of these topics is worthy of individual attention, to be sure-but it is also particularly interesting and useful to take a broad, general view of PTA decision making, and that is this Article's purpose. Taking such a view reveals that the choices made about PTA form, membership and scope essentially boil down to one core decision-namely, the choice between "deepening" trade relationships versus "broadening" them. That is, when countries are considering how to promote or formalize their preferential trade arrangements, they essentially have two basic choices. First, the countries can deepen the relationship among themselves, so as to promote trade and integration in that manner. Second, they can broaden their trade arrangements to include other countries or regions as well, which often results in less direct economic benefit but which can be Much of the academic literature discussing the question of "deepening" versus "broadening" in preferential trade has been focused on the European Union, 70 but the deepening versus broadening dichotomy works well in other contexts as well, and in particular with respect to current U.S. PTA activity. It is therefore useful to first review deepening versus broadening debates that have taken place in Europe, and then try to apply a deepening versus broadening analysis to the subject of U.S. PTA activity.
1

A. European Integration and "Deepening" versus "Broadening"
In the 1980s and early 1990s, a debate raged in Europe over the future development of the European Community (now the EU). 72 In the immediate wake of the Cold War, with the pending reunification of Germany and the possibility of many former Soviet bloc states seeking admission to the Community (along with perennial applicant Turkey), 73 the question took on a new and added urgency. The Community was generally seen as an economic success, and there was general consensus that the goal of more meaningful internal economic integration should be pursued. Yet there was internal disagreement concerning the pace of integration-and perhaps more 71. The focus of this Article is on internal EU deepening, not on the EU's more recent external PTA efforts. The EU has undertaken those, and they are certainly important-and indeed in many ways they are like the United States' current PTA efforts. See infra Part IV.B. Yet there has not been much discussion of the conceptual link between internal and external broadening versuis deepening efforts, and a primary purpose of this Article is to explore that gap. importantly, there was disagreement over which countries should be involved.
At the risk of oversimplification, two general schools of thought emerged. First, a number of European continental observers favored expansion of EU membership to include a modest-to-large number of new states. 74 Politically speaking, the reasoning went, the collapse of the Iron Curtain presented an unprecedented opportunity to heal Europe's East-versus-West schism. Expansion offered the prospect of bringing eastern parts of Europe into the fold, so to speak, and offered Western European countries the chance to exercise greater influence over Eastern European countries during a time of economic and political adjustment that posed risk for unrest and destabilization. 75 This was, in other words, a political and foreign policy benefit, rather than a purely commercial one. It was also argued by some observers that rapid expansion of Community membership would not cause difficulties in terms of coordination of economic policies and efforts to deepen economic and monetary coordination among existing European Community 76 member states. The assumption underlying the latter arguments was that any costs of integration with new members would be exceeded by the benefits, at least in the long term.
Second, other observers-many of whom were British Euroskeptics to begin with-generally opposed the broadening of Community membership until the economies of existing member states could be more closely integrated and coordinated, and these objections predated the end of the Cold War. 77 While a review of these objections to deepening reveals that in many respects (stating that British skeptics thought other EU member "governments were insincere about creating a Single Market" and that "imperfections in trade still remained); Hooghe & Marks, supra note 76, at 8-9 (discussing "neoliberal" and "nationalist" opposition in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Benelux countries to "market regulation" by the EU in the 1980s and 1990s).
[Vol. 19:3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF "DEEP" VERSUS "BROAD" PTAs they were veiled (or not so veiled) concerns over sovereignty, 78 the objections also had economic bases. Skeptical observers noted that while some core members of the European Community (namely the Benelux countries) already were closely integrated by the late 1980s and early 1990s and had similar economic structures (and currencies voluntarily pegged to one another), there were still large economic disparities among Community members as a whole.
79
These observers argued (and these arguments were by no means new) that adding additional members, especially ones that were even more economically divergent than current members, would be disastrous for Community cohesion and policymaking. Rather than extending the reach and influence of the European Community by adding new members, these observers contended that expansion of Community membership would further reduce the ability of Community member states to reach consensus and make effective decisions regarding the future course of the Community. 8 0 There were concerns that broader integration would lead to greater emigration from lesser developed to more developed member states, 17, 1996 , available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F06EOD61639F934A25750COA960958260 (stating that many "Euro-skeptics" oppose further EU integration because they believe "a common currency [will be] the . . . acid that will corrode national sovereignty and lead inevitably to a single political bloc"); Forster, supra note 77, at 6, 72-73 (noting that "sovereignty and autonomy" were major British concerns); MICHAEL J. BAuN, AN IMPERFECT UNION 61 (Westview Press 1996) (stating that the "primary opponent" to the European Monetary Union was Britain, due to concerns over a deterioration of"national sovereignty"); Hooghe & Marks, supra note 76, at 2 (stating that many Europeans feared that a shift of authority and decision making power to a central body would threaten "the sovereignty of member states").
79. 
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coordination-treating economically diverse states more like a single economy-would hamper economic and fiscal planning at the national level.
82
A primary focus on deepening integration among existing Community members, rather than on broadening to include new members, was therefore advocated.
On the face of it, then, both proponents and opponents of broadening generally agreed that further internal deepening of the Community could be desirable and beneficial. Yet they disagreed, in chicken-and-egg fashion, about whether deepening or broadening should come first, and which would best further the development of the other. While neoclassical economic theory generally was on the side of the skeptics-in the sense that it suggested very strongly that the commercial gains to existing members from broadening the community might be outweighed by the costs of integrating these new economies into the Community fold 3-the European proponents of broadening before deepening nevertheless prevailed, and between 1986 and 2007 seventeen new member states were added to what is now the EU (with most of these being added after the end of the Cold War). 84 Additional new member states likely will be added in the near future.
This broadening was not costless, of course, which strongly suggests that the observations of the critics of broadening were valid in many respects. The unification of Germany was the cause of enormous internal economic and political stresses, 85 and the admission of Greece and Spain in the 1980s led to enormous costs later, as both countries struggled to coordinate their fiscal policies with other disparate EU economies such as Germany and France. that the (very significant) short-term economic costs of EU broadening were indeed outweighed by long-term economic gains? That is, was broadening a "loss leader" approach to PTAs, pursuant to which the costs and inconveniences of regional coordination and cooperation were frontloaded in order to achieve longer term, and ultimately beneficial, coordination of efforts? Or was this simply a case of political considerations taking precedence over economic ones?
B. Application of Deepening versus Broadening" Framework to U.S. PTAs
The deepening versus broadening conceptual framework from the EU's internal experience can be quite informative when applied to more recent PTA efforts, especially by the United States. On the one hand, the United States and EU preferential trade experiences are quite different. The United States certainly has never undertaken anything akin to the EU's internal integration efforts (at least since the Articles of Confederation), and its preferential trade efforts have been ad hoc. The EU, by contrast, has developed as a confederation of states embedded in an increasingly formalized legal and commercial framework. On the other hand, PTAs increasingly have been considered by the United States for significant non-economic reasons, such as the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement 88 and MEFTA. 89 PTAs of this sort are akin in some of their justifications, as well as their effects, to the EU members' repeated decisions to broaden the EU, rather than to focus first on deepening existing intra-EU relationships. That is, rather than concentrating on deepening existing and successful U.S. PTAs or seeking to deepen ties with countries with which the United States shares strong commercial interests and economic structural similarities, the United States instead has sought in many cases to expand its political reach and influence through the signing of new PTAs with other states, even when-and indeed especially when-these new PTAs appear to offer the United States marginal economic benefit.
It must be noted that in recent years the EU has taken to signing (as a unified bloc) external PTAs with third countries, such as Mexico (2001) 
.90 This does not undermine the validity of the U.S.-EU comparison, however. Rather, it is an example of the EU also taking a shallower "broad" approach in recent years.
Deepening versus Broadening and U.S. Commercial Considerations
The deepening versus broadening dichotomy works well to explain the difference between U.S. commercially driven and non-commercially driven PTAs. With commercially-driven PTAs, there is U.S. interest in achieving greater integration with the other economies involved. NAFTA and its side agreements serve as a good example of this: there is a willingness-perhaps even a desire-to achieve closer U.S. economic integration with Canada. Even with Mexico, which has been the source of a great deal of NAFTA-related political tension in the United States, the very concerns the United States has about its trade relations with Mexico center on elements of greater economic integration-namely, labor mobility, direct investment, agriculture and trucking.
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With non-commercially driven PTAs, in contrast, the primary U.S. interest lies in expanding formal (or in some cases, less formal) U.S. trade relations to include new countries for a variety of other reasons. Given the structural economic disparities between the United States and many of these other countries, deeper integration might prove difficult, and in any event the economic gains to the United States from liberalized trade with those countries are marginal at best. If direct economic gains from trade were the primary factor involved, it is likely these PTAs would never come to pass. PTAs of this sort include the proposed (and to date troubled) U.S. [Vol. 19:3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF "DEEP" VERSUS "BROAD" PTAs Trade Promotion Agreement; the latter has been proposed, not surprisingly, due to the Panama Canal and its importance to U.S. security and trade. 93 With respect to the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Promotional Agreement, President Bush's remarks to Congress in April 2008, when his administration was seeking congressional approval of this pact via implementing legislation, were particularly telling. The first justification given for this proposed PTA was that it would "advance America's national security interests in a critical region." 94 The second justification-closely related to the first-was the need "to strengthen a courageous ally." 9 U.S. economic interests were only listed third. 96 President Bush made similar statements at other times as well, as did other U.S. government officials. 97 Moreover, the commercially-focused justifications given by U.S. officials for this PTA have emphasized the large economic benefits to Colombia, not to the United States, due to the fact that the United States is Colombia's largest trading partner. 98 Similar national security statements have been made by U.S. officials about the U.S.-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement. 99 Article by discussing potential future U.S. PTA activity and likely areas of inactivity.
First, this Article's conceptualization of PTAs suggests that PTA formation follows either economic or non-commercial national security or foreign policy interests, and that the balance of these two considerations will affect the scope, membership, and structure of each particular PTA. It also suggests that when neither type of interest is present, PTAs will not be formed, or if formed will be ineffective. On the one hand, such an observation-that PTAs will not be successfully formed when there are little benefits involved for all parties-might appear trite. On the other hand, the United States has been involved in PTA-related efforts over the past decade that satisfy neither condition-efforts that have yielded little or no direct results. This is therefore an observation worth making, any apparent obviousness notwithstanding.
For example, this conceptualization helps explain the lack of progress on PTA initiatives such as the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), for which there is (or at least there is perceived to be) neither strong economic benefit over current arrangements nor any grand, pressing security need. Trade Promotion Agreement is likely to be approved, 1 6 and while the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Promotional Agreement l I7 appeared moribund at the end of the second Bush administration, it is possible that this PTA also may be approved under the Obama administration.' In each of these cases, a narrower economic or foreign policy interest has justified the effort involved in negotiating and forming a PTA.
This observation also helps explain the disturbing American inaction to date concerning PTAs in sub-Saharan Africa. U.S. President Clinton signed the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2000 to great fanfare," 19 and four years later President Bush signed the AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004. 120 The United States also explored the possibility of establishing a free trade agreement with the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). 12 ' Like some of the smaller western hemispheric PTAs the United States has recently entered into, much of the focus of any U.S.-African PTAs would necessarily be on agriculture and textiles.
Yet the United States' trade numbers with sub-Saharan Africa have remained small-the export market was worth only US$14 billion as of 2007122 and has not increased much, if any, since then. Moreover, unlike western hemispheric countries, sub-Saharan African countries fall outside the United States' immediate geographic sphere of influence. It is not surprising, then, that the efforts of both the Clinton and second Bush administrations never matched their rhetoric. 23 For example, President Bush's 2008 visit to Africa
